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Prior literature shows that financial disclosures and corporate governance both impact firm 
performance. This paper documents an important topic that has been overlooked in the prior 
literature, their joint effect, because the two mechanisms could be independent, substitutive, or 
complementary in their impact on firm performance. We find a substitutive relation based on data 
from 2005–2013 for a sample of US biotech firms, but only for firms with products in advanced 
stages of development, because their disclosures are trustworthy about the firms’ future 
performance. We do not find such effect for firms with early-stage products, that would take years 
to convert to profits, and whose product-related disclosures are speculative at best. This paper 
shows that informative and reliable voluntary disclosures have similar value-increasing effect as 
corporate governance and that the marginal effect of trustworthy disclosures is decreasing in 
governance. To the extent that the two mechanisms are costly, firms can partly substitute one for 
the other. 
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1 Introduction 
Managers often convey their private information to investors via voluntary disclosures. Hence capital market 
participants benefit when a firm provides transparent and adequate information to assess the firm’s future 
performance. Previous theoretical and empirical literature shows that voluntary disclosures reduce cost of capital 
(Barry and Brown 1985; Botosan 1997; Sengupta 1998; Easley and O’Hara 2004; Hughes, Liu and Liu 2007; 
Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia 2007), improve firm performance and stock liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; 
Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Healy, Palepu and Hutton 1999), and increase information intermediation (Lang and 
Lundholm 1993; Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, and Zang 2008).  
Although there are significant capital market benefits associated with greater transparency, voluntary 
disclosures are not costless. Voluntary disclosures could reveal information that the firm would otherwise not reveal 
to competitors, potential entrants, regulators, customers, and suppliers. Any details about R&D activities, such as 
products under development, could increase proprietary costs because the rivals might capitalize on that information 
to more effectively compete with the disclosing firm (Verrecchia 1983; 2001; Dye 1985, 2001; Darrough and 
Stoughton 1990; Wagenhofer 1990). Hence, managers must trade benefits from reduced information asymmetry 
against the costs of reducing competitive advantage (Wagenhofer 1990; Hayes and Lundholm 1996). That is, 
managers must selectively provide forward-looking, business-specific disclosures on R&D projects, only when their 
benefits exceed costs (Jones 2007; Merkley 2014).   
While firm disclosures can improve investors’ decisions, they do not equally benefit all investors. Kalay 
(2015) argues that disclosures benefit different classes on investors differently depending on their levels of 
sophistication. Investors with strategic informational advantage might not prefer additional disclosures, because those 
disclosure would also reach less-informed investors and reduce better-informed investors’ trading advantage. On the 
other hand, investors with no informational advantage, such as common investors, would prefer enhanced disclosures 
to reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors as well as to reduce trading disadvantage vis-a-vis 
sophisticated investors. So, the demand for disclosures could differ between different classes of investors. 
Disclosures are also a mechanism of improving managers’ accountability to shareholders. In a world with 
complete information, the mechanisms of accountability would be of little utility because investors would price 
protect themselves. Under incomplete contracts and bounded rationality, however, both corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure make managers accountable. Voluntary disclosures reduce information asymmetry and diminish 
the top managers’ extraction of private benefits that occurs in opaque information environments. Well-designed 
corporate governance also reduces managers’ opportunistic behaviour, but, in addition, forces managers to disclose 
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more information. Therefore, the two mechanisms of corporate governance and voluntary disclosures can have 
complementary or substitutive relationship in affecting firm performance.  
Extensive literature examines the association between corporate disclosures and firm performance. On one 
hand, some studies conclude that disclosure improves firm performance (e.g., Plumlee, Brown, Hayes and Marshall 
2015; Elzahar, Hussainey, Mazzi and Tsalavoutas 2015). On the other hand, other studies find no association 
between disclosure and performance (e.g., Hassan, Romilly, Giorgioni and Power 2009; Hassanien and Hussainey 
2015). Prior research also provides evidence that better corporate governance improves voluntary disclosures and 
makes those disclosure more informative (Wang and Hussainey 2013). In this paper, we aim to address an important 
unanswered question: whether product-related voluntary disclosures affect firm performance and, if so, whether 
corporate governance enhances or moderates the impact of disclosures on corporate performance (Beekes, Brown, 
Zhan and Zhang 2016).  We respond to call by Christensen (2016) who suggests that future research should examine 
the interaction between corporate governance and voluntary disclosures in impact on firm performance. 
To improve our identification strategy, we examine our research question in a single industry context, the 
biotechnology sector. The biotech sector provides an appropriate setting for investigating disclosures because incurs 
large R&D investments with uncertain payoffs and has large amount of unreported intangible assets, high information 
asymmetries between managers and investors, and high proprietary costs associated with disclosures about products 
under development (Guo, Lev and Zhou 2004; Dedman, Lin, Prakash, and Chang 2008; Hussainey and Walker 2009). 
Biotech companies may increase their levels of voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and signal their 
good performance. Furthermore, better corporate governance may force companies to reveal more information to 
reduce information asymmetries with investors. In that case, corporate governance would have complementary 
relation with voluntary disclosures in affecting firm performance.  On the other hand, because of the high levels of 
proprietary costs, resulting from disclosing sensitive information that potentially damages the firm’s competitive 
advantages, better-governed biotech companies might keep their voluntary disclosures at low levels. In that case, 
better corporate governance, instead of large voluntary disclosure, might have greater impact on corporate 
performance, and the effect of two mechanisms would be substitutive.   
We measure firm performance by Tobin’s Q consistent with previous literature (e.g., Setia-Atmaja et al. 
2009; Zhao and Murrell 2016). We measure the quality of corporate governance using the principal component 
analysis of eight different governance measures: the proportion of independent directors on the board, board size, 
CEO duality, board busyness (directors sitting on more than four boards), percentage of women directors, percentage 
of insider ownership, the frequency of board meetings and percentage of holdings by the top five owners in the 
company. We retain components with eigenvalues greater than one. We measure corporate disclosures using a unique 
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set of hand-collected data from biotechnology firms, following Guo et al. (2004). We construct a disclosure index, 
based on product specifications, target disease, clinical trials, future development plans, and market information. We 
employ a battery of control variables in our multivariate tests that could affect firm profitability as well as corporate 
governance and disclosures, such as firm size and age, leverage, loss, institutional holdings, and accounting accruals.  
When examined independently, we find that both disclosure and governance mechanisms positively impact 
current and future firm performance, up to two years ahead. More important, when considered together, the product-
related disclosure and corporate governance have a substitutive effect on firm performance. This finding provides 
preliminary evidence of reduced marginal benefits of disclosures in presence of good governance. 
We then divide disclosures into two types: those related to early stage products (preclinical) and those related 
to more advanced stage products (clinical). All else held equal, information on early stage products is highly 
confidential and can impose large competitive disadvantages when disclosed. Nevertheless, the prospects of these 
early stage products are highly uncertain, because they can fail at any stage of their development process. Prior studies 
show that the probability of a chemical compound making it through from discovery (preclinical phases) to final 
commercialization (market launch) is one in 5,000 (Healy et al. 2002). Hence, any information about preclinical 
products is unlikely to change investors’ assessments of future profitability. In contrast, information on advanced-
stage products would not only convey promising, positive news about the firm, it would also impose lesser proprietary 
costs of information, because even if competitors become aware of these products, it would take them long lead times 
to create competitive products.  
We find an insignificant association between preclinical disclosures and firm performance, consistent with 
the idea that investors have lesser confidence in disclosures on early-stage products. We also find no evidence of 
substitutive or complementary relationship between preclinical disclosures and corporate governance on firm 
performance. In contrast, we find a positive association between clinical disclosures and firm performance. More 
important, we find a strong substitutive relation between corporate governance and clinical disclosures. These results 
are consistent with the idea that better governance has a similar effect as that of disclosures in impacting firm 
performance. More important, this substitutive effect holds only for disclosures that are reliable and are better 
predictors of forthcoming profitability, not for disclosures that enhance uncertainty about future profits.  
In sum, this paper contributes to disclosure/governance and firm performance literature by being the first—
to the best of our knowledge—to examine the joint effect of disclosure and governance on firm performance (Beyer, 
Cohen, Lys and Walther 2010). We also provide the first evidence that the impact of disclosure on firm performance 
depends on the reliability of disclosures. That is, informative and reliable voluntary disclosures have similar value-
increasing effect as corporate governance, but not those that are speculative or uninformative about future 
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performance. To the extent that the two mechanisms of corporate governance and proprietary disclosures are costly, 
firms with more trustworthy disclosures can at least partly substitute one for the other.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework, reviews prior literature and 
develops our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology and the data. Section 4 presents our findings. 
Section 5 presents our robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.  
2 Hypothesis development 
Several theories explain why firms voluntarily disclose information. Hope (2003, p. 220) argues that 
“disclosure is inherently a complex phenomenon and a single theory can only give a partial explanation.” The section, 
therefore, develops an overarching theoretical framework that helps in explaining the product-related voluntary 
disclosure practice of US biotech firms and this practice affect the performance of these firms. Following Chen and 
Roberts (2010), we introduce a theoretical framework that helps us to develop our research hypotheses and in 
interpreting the findings. We consider disclosure theories as complementary rather than competing. Our multi-
theoretical framework includes economic incentive theories (agency theory, signalling theory, capital need theory and 
information cost theory) and system-oriented theories (political cost theory, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory).  
Accounting theory predicts that capital market benefits accrue to firms when they provide transparent and 
adequate information useful to the investors in predicting firms’ future performance.  One mechanism to provide this 
information is through voluntary disclosures.  Firms use disclosure as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetries 
between managers and investors, to reduce the firms’ costs of capital, to increase the stock prices and ultimately 
increase shareholders’ wealth.  
However, disclosures are not costless.  Signalling theory, originally proposed by Akerlof (1970) and 
developed by Spence (1973), suggests that companies are motivated to disclose more information to signal their good 
performance and to avoid any adverse interpretation by stock market participants. Capital need theory suggests that 
firms will increase the extent of their disclosure information when they need to raise their external finances to reduce 
their cost of capital (Firth, 1980). Therefore, we expect that companies will provide extensive product-related 
voluntary disclosure to attract more potential investors and raise their external finances. Information cost theory 
suggests that companies will provide more information if they potentially gain some economic benefits (Cooke 1992). 
Therefore, we believe that companies will disclose product-related voluntary disclosure information if the benefits 
from disclosing information outweigh its costs. These theories suggest that high levels of disclosure lead to desirable 
economic consequences. Therefore, we expect that such increase in disclosure will have a positive impact on corporate 
performance.  
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The above-mentioned theories, however, emphasise economic and finance perspectives, neglect cognitive, 
social, and other factors (Elbannan and McKinley 2006). They consider only the relationship between managers and 
owners and ignore other stakeholders. It is, therefore, important to consider other theories that complement the 
economic incentive theories. 
Deegan and Unerman (2006) classify political economy theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and 
institutional theory as system-oriented theories because of the fact that companies are considered part of a social 
system that interacts with society. Based on political cost theory, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that politically 
sensitive companies are subject to high political costs and, therefore, are willing to disclose more information to reduce 
these costs. In our paper, we consider large and profitable firms as politically sensitive and that these firms are likely 
to be more transparent through more product-related voluntary disclosure to reduce the political cost. Consequently, 
we expect a higher performance for firms with higher levels of disclosure.  
Based on stakeholder theory, companies should treat all stakeholders fairly (O’Dwyer, 2002). However, 
stakeholders may be treated differently by a firm depending on the power they have (Smith, Adhikari, and Tondkar 
2005). In addition, different stakeholders could have differential demand for information (Kalay 2015). This might 
explain the motives for companies to voluntarily disclose product-related information to satisfy certain stakeholders. 
Legitimacy theory suggests that companies might have incentives to increase disclosure to meet the perceptions of 
societies. Firms will have incentives to increase the extent of product-related information to maintain legitimacy status. 
Institutional theory is concerned with both the interaction of firms with their institutional environment and the impact 
of the social expectation of the firms. We argue that firms might disclose high level of product-related information in 
their annual reports to meet the expectation in their institutions.  
The above-mentioned theories suggest that demand for corporate disclosure arises from information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts between insiders (managers) and outsiders (stakeholders). Therefore, managers might   
increase the levels of disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. Considering the fact that financial 
statement are losing their relevance and, hence, the traditional accounting model no longer satisfies users’ needs (Lev, 
1989), we expect that managers will disclose more non-financial information. In our paper, we argue that managers 
of biotechnology firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose more information about their products to complement 
the information reported in their financial statements. A rich information environment and low information asymmetry 
could lead to desirable economic consequences. One of these is to improve the firm performance. 
2.1 Disclosure and Firm Performance 
Accounting information plays a role in valuation because it enables capital providers to evaluate potential 
return on investment opportunities (Beyer et al. 2010). It also plays a stewardship role as it allows capital providers to 
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effectively manage and utilize their invested capital in a certain company.  Furthermore, corporate disclosure corrects 
firm mis-valuation and increases the liquidity of a firm’s stock (Healy et al. 1999). Athanasakou and Hussainey (2014) 
show that voluntary disclosure improves the credibility to financial statements and enhances the perceptions of the 
market’s participants of future corporate performance.  
Sheu, Chung, and Liu (2010) argue that disclosure should correct any firm misvaluation by reducing 
information asymmetry among insiders and outsiders, hence, increases firm performance. Corporate performance is 
increasing in disclosure through either reduced cost of capital, increased cash flow to shareholders or both. In addition, 
increasing disclosure sends signals to the market that a company’s net present value is expected to increase and hence 
its performance (Gordon, Loeb and Sohail 2010, Zhang and Ding, 2006). Van Buskirk (2012) find that greater 
disclosure reduces information asymmetry among investors. Empirical research shows that increased disclosure 
reduces estimation risk in two ways: first, securities with more information are less risky because of lower uncertainty 
surrounding the exact parameters of their return distribution (e.g., Clarkson, Guedes, and Thompson 1996; Easley and 
O'Hara 2004); and, second, the covariance of a firm's cash flow with the cash flow of other firms decreases as 
disclosures increases (e.g., Hughes, Liu and Liu 2007; Lambert et al. 2007). Thus, enhanced disclosure directly 
reduces the estimation risk that leads to an indirect reduction in the firm's cost of capital. This is also useful in 
examining the link between disclosure and firm performance. In addition to the direct effects on the covariance of a 
firm’s cash flow, corporate disclosures have the potential to change the firm performance by affecting managers' 
decisions and, hence, altering the distribution of future cash flows (Lambert et al. 2007). Thus, there might be indirect 
effects on firm performance through cash flow expectations formed based on enhanced disclosure.  
The empirical literature examining the link between corporate disclosure and firm performance offers mixed 
results. On one hand, several studies find a positive association between these two variables (e.g., Waddock and 
Graves 1997; Baek, Kang and Park 2004; Chi 2009; Cheung, Jiang and Tan 2010; Sheu et al. 2010; Jiao 2011; Elzahar 
et al. 2015; Plumlee et al.. 2015). In a recent study, Zhao and Murrell (2016) provide evidence that the positive 
governance-disclosure relation of Waddock and Graves (1997) is not generalizable to different sample that include 
more firms over a longer time period.  They, however, did not explain the reasons for these mixed results. 
On the other hand, Hassan et al. (2009) and Hassanien and Hussainey (2015) find no significant association 
between firm performance and voluntary disclosure, while a negative and significant relationship exists with 
mandatory disclosure when the relation of their relationship with market value is tested simultaneously. Hassanien 
and Hussainey (2015) also find that change in voluntary disclosure has no effect on the value of well-performing firms, 
while it negatively affects poorly performing firms. 
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Several studies hypothesise and find that voluntary disclosure affects future firm performance. These include 
Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994), Bryan (1997) and Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1999). Related studies find 
that voluntary disclosure improves investors’ ability to anticipate future earnings (e.g. Hussainey, Schleicher and 
Walker 2003). This suggests that voluntary disclosure contains value relevant information.  
Zahller, Arnold and Roberts (2015) provide recent evidence investors perceive companies’ legitimacy to be 
higher with high level of disclosure. This implies that high-quality voluntary disclosure helps protecting corporate 
financial market performance following an exogenous shock through the disclosure’s effect on perceived legitimacy 
(Zahller et al., 2015). Therefore, we expect that product-related voluntary disclosure might lead to a positive impact 
on firm performance. 
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesise that: 
H1: Product-related disclosure is positively associated with current and future firm performance. 
2.2 Governance and Firm Performance     
The governance-performance literature shows that corporate governance affects firm performance (e.g. 
Cheung, Connelly, Jiang and Limpaphayom 2011). It shows that high-quality governance increases a firm’s cash flow, 
which ultimately is reflected in higher firm performance (Bozec, Dia, and Bozec 2010). It is also argued that corporate 
governance increases returns to shareholders by reducing transaction and agency costs and, hence, it is considered as 
a success factor for financial markets (Baek et al. 2004), as better-governed firms have higher firm performance 
(Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003; Klapper and Love 2004; Brown and Caylor 2006; Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid 
2011; Braga-Alves and Shastri 2011; Sami, Wang and Zhou 2011; Black, de Carvalho, and Gorga 2012; Ammann, 
Oesch, and Schmid 2013). La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Vishny (2002) argue that in countries where laws are in 
favour of investor protection, investors are willing to pay more for a firm’s equity. Therefore, investors recognise that 
with better legal protection, the problem of conflicting investor-management interests will be minimised. This 
argument presents corporate governance as a kind of investor protection mechanism, which mitigates agency problems 
and therefore enhances firm performance. Based on these arguments, one should expect a positive association between 
corporate governance and firm performance. In addition, while Gompers et al.  (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2009) find that external governance increases corporate performance, Cremers and Nair (2005) find that both external 
and internal governance increase corporate performance.  
Despite the above, other studies offer contrasting evidence on the association between corporate governance 
and firm performance (Baek et al. 2004). Some studies find no association between the two variables (Klein, Shapiro 
and Young 2005). Bozec et al. (2010:685) conclude that, “overall, prior studies fail to find convincing evidence that 
corporate governance affects firm performance or value”. In their review article, Bozec and Bozec (2012) note, 
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however, that the relation between governance and performance is positive in Europe and emerging economies, 
whereas researchers using American and Canadian contexts found mixed evidence on the governance-performance 
relation.  
We expect that good governance should improve firm performance for biotechnology firms, as high-quality 
governance reduces managers-shareholders’ conflicts (Fama and Jensen 1983) and, hence, reduces agency costs and 
information asymmetry. Consequently, this might lead to an increase in firm performance. Based on the above 
arguments, we hypothesise that: 
H2: Corporate governance is positively associated with current and future firm performance. 
2.3 The Joint Effect of Disclosure and Governance and Firm performance 
The above hypotheses suggest that disclosure and governance separately affect firm performance. To the best 
of our knowledge, none of the prior research examines the joint effect of disclosure and governance on performance. 
Disclosure is a core attribute of the corporate governance (OCED 1999) and is regarded as an external factor in the 
quality of corporate governance system (Chi, 2009). Beekes and Brown (2006) find that firms with high quality 
governance system have disclosures that are more informative. Beekes et al. (2016), who provide evidence those firms 
with better corporate governance, substitute the governance process for greater disclosure. 
The joint effect of disclosure and governance of firm performance has been only indirectly investigated. For 
example, Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that the disclosure of governance practice reduces information asymmetry 
and help investors to effectively monitor management decisions and corporate performance. In addition, Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) find that disclosure of well-governed firms improves investors’ ability to predict future earnings. In 
our paper, we directly examine the joint impact of disclosure and governance on firm performance.  
Following Hussainey and Walker (2009), we propose four different scenarios. First, product related voluntary 
disclosure and governance are different ways of conveying the same information. Thus, the impact of each variable 
on firm performance is exactly similar to the joint impact of both variables on firm performance.  
H3: The joint effect of product-related voluntary disclosure and governance on firm performance is similar to the 
impact of each individual variable on current and future firm performance.  
Second, product-related voluntary disclosure and governance provide (‘additive’) unrelated information. 
Thus, the joint effect of both variables on firm performance should be insignificant. 
H4: The joint effect of product-related disclosure and governance on current and future firm performance is additive.  
Third, product-related voluntary disclosure and governance provide related information that is ‘reinforcing’ 
or ‘multiplicative’. In this case, the joint impact of product-related disclosure and governance should be higher than 
the impact of each variable on firm performance. We refer to this as a complementary effect hypothesis.  
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H5: Product-related disclosure and governance are complementary in their impact on current and future firm 
performance.  
Product-related disclosures are costly, on one hand, but reduce the information asymmetry and the associated 
agency costs, on the other hand. Effective governance and board oversight reduces the agency costs, thereby reduce 
the need for costly disclosures (Rediker and Seth 1995; Satta et al. 2014). Hence, we now describe that product-related 
disclosures, corporate governance are strategic substitutes, and that the marginal benefit of disclosures decreases in 
corporate governance. This idea is consistent with Bulow et al (1985).   
H6: Product-related disclosure and governance are substitutes in their impact on current and future firm performance. 
3 Methodology and data  
In this section, we describe the selection of sample firms from the biotechnology sector and the measurement 
of key variables. 
3.1 Sample selection  
 Our sample contains a random sample of the about 10% active biotechnology firms listed on the US stock 
exchanges from 2005 to 2013. We restrict our sample to firms that have products under development (other than 
products involving gene therapy, medical devices, and research services). We retain firms that discontinued drug 
development for a few years due to the failure of clinical trials (for example, Prana Biotech and PDL Biopharma), 
provided they had product development during the other years. In these cases, we retain only the firm-year 
observations in which they conduct development activities. This results in a varying sample size across the study 
period, consisting of 647 firm-years observations, as described in Table 1.  
The biotech industry is particularly interesting from a disclosure point of view: ‘the unusually fast innovation 
pace in the biotech sector and the low barriers to entry enhance competition and ... create large information 
asymmetries between managers and investors, which increase the benefits of disclosure’ (Guo et al., 2004, p. 320). 
Indeed, biotech companies can experience negative financial performance for a long period; therefore, their ability to 
attract capital is strictly linked with the ability to build and deploy intangible capital, such as products under 
development. The products-related information is therefore particularly crucial to our sample of biotech companies 
because most of them have negligible earnings, low revenues and few physical assets. Our sample of biotechnology 
firms invest large amounts on R&D and have product-development cycles running into decades (it can take 10-12 
years for a product to reach Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval and consequently to generate revenues. 
Therefore, many firms report losses or have negative book values. This is precisely the strength of our study: 
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disclosures assume paramount importance because financial statements fail to present an accurate picture of firm’s 
operating performance. 
3.2 Measurement of variables  
  The dependent variable, Tobin’s Q, is built using COMPUSTAT data, while the independent variables (the 
various disclosure indexes – total disclosure, preclinical and technical disclosure index and board governance 
variables- Comp1, Comp2 and Comp3, as described below) are hand-collected from the 10-K form and from the DEF 
14A Proxy Statement, respectively. The control variables are constructed using COMPUSTAT data.  
3.2.1 Dependent variable. Why use Tobin’s Q? 
Tobin’s Q measures firm performance. Tobin’s Q is a widely applied measure within the corporate 
governance literature that serves as a proxy for a firm’s ability to generate shareholder wealth. The denominator in 
Tobin’s Q serves as a proxy for the replacement value of the firm’s current assets. If the ratio is less than 1, it is 
cheaper to buy capacity in the financial markets than in the real asset markets. If, on the other hand, a firm’s Tobin’s 
Q exceeds 1, this may reflect the presence of strong comparative advantages or growth opportunities (See Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Darius 1999) for a careful econometric analysis of managerial ownership and performance relying on 
Tobin’s Q.) One may use other performance measures, e.g., accounting-based measures such as return on equity and 
return on assets, but these measures are very sensitive to management’s choice of asset valuation principles. Other 
studies use the decomposition of Tobin’s Q into three components: price-to-operating earnings, financial leverage, 
and operating profitability as a measure of firm performance (Fang, Noe, and Tice 2009). Nevertheless, Tobin’s Q 
decomposition is valid only if the three components, price-to-operating earnings, financial leverage, and operating 
profitability, are in the same direction as Tobin’s Q. If any of these three variables is negative, then the sense of 
directionality is lost. Our biotech sample is not suitable to using the Tobin’s Q decomposition as many firms report 
losses or have negative book values. Eliminating loss or negative book value firms from our sample leads to severe 
truncation of our sample, more than 60% observations are lost.   
Another possibility is to use risk-adjusted stock returns such as “Jensen’s alfa”. The dilemma with all risk-
adjusted performance measures is to find an unbiased proxy for the risk. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as is 
evident from the existence of a range of risk-adjusted performance measures using different risk measures, e.g., the 
beta value of the portfolio, three-, four-, or five-factor models, or the portfolio standard deviation. Consequently, the 
vast majority of studies in corporate governance relies on Tobin’s Q. Thus, we use Tobin’s Q as our dependent variable 
to proxy for current firm performance.  Following Zhao and Murrell (2016) we use future Tobin’s Q as a proxy for 
future firm performance.  
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Baseline Model:  
Tobin’s Qt+1 = α+ β1disclt+ β2 governancet + β3discl*governancet+ β4
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 + β
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 + β
6
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t
  
β
7
losst + β8lnatt + β9acct + ε          (Eq.1) 
Where Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total 
assets (Setia-Atmaja et al. 2009). The independent variables are defined in Appendix B.  
In our main analyses, we include firm fixed effects by demeaning observations by firm to control for the impacts 
of time-invariant firm characteristics on firm performance. 
 3.2.2  Product–development-related information (product disclosure index) 
We employ a unique sample of hand-collected data. Our measure of proprietary cost is based on the 
disclosure index of Guo et al.  (2004). Following their methodology, we construct Product Disclosure for each 
biotechnology product by hand-collecting relevant information from business section (Part I) of the 10-K. Specifically, 
the disclosure index is derived from the following five categories: product specifications, target disease, clinical trials, 
future development plans, and market information. Product Specification captures information on the properties of 
the product under development. Target Disease captures information on the intended use of the product, which is the 
type of diseases. Clinical Trials captures information on the success of the clinical trials process, number of patients, 
method used to test the molecule, results for the various trials. Future Development Plan captures the future product 
development plans. Market Information captures the products or disease market potential. Each category is assigned 
a score according to the disclosed information.  The maximum score which a product under development disclosure 
could earn for all the five categories (previously specified) is 30 if the product is on a clinical phase of development 
or beyond (phase I, II, III or FDA review); and 22 if the product under development is in screening, IND or preclinical 
phase, according to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classification on the various phase of development of 
biotech products. We hand collect the information for a total number of 5,027 products under development in various 
stages of development. 
Appendix A specifies the components of the disclosure index with an example of the construction of the 
product-disclosure score for MAXY-G34, one of the products developed by Maxygen in 2008 fiscal year. For each 
product, we assign a score to the five categories describe above.3 To ensure the comparability of the product scores, 
we divide the summarized disclosure scores by the maximum attainable score of 30 (for the clinical products) and 22 
(for the preclinical products).  Thus, the product–level disclosure index is the ratio of the disclosure score to the 
maximum possible disclosure score, and ranges in value from 0 to 1.  To compute a firm-year level Product Disclosure 
score, we average the disclosure score for all products for a firm in a given year. 
                                                          
3 If a product has not entered the clinical trial stage, this category is omitted. 
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3.2.3  Board structure measures  
We consider five board-related variables: board independence measured as the percentage of independent 
directors on the board (comp1); board size measured as the total number of directors (comp2); and the CEO duality is 
an indicator variable that has a value of 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the firm and 0 otherwise (Comp3).   
To develop our corporate governance indices, we use exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) to 
identify the underlying dimensions or structure of corporate governance and determine which indicators are associated 
with each factor. We retain all factors with an eigenvalue greater than the unity. This results in three factors (Comp1, 
Comp2 and Comp3) that retain almost 90% of the total variance in the original data. This reduced solution is then 
rotated using an oblique rotation that allows the retained factors to be correlated in order to enhance the interpretability 
of the results.  
Principal component factor analysis is first applied to all the individual measures of corporate governance 
characteristics – board independence, board size, CEO duality, percentage of women on board, insiders and 
institutional investors’ ownership concentration – to derive an overall factor score for the Governance variable. Three 
measures – board independence, board size and CEO duality – are loaded on a single factor with an eigenvalue greater 
than 1 and capture a significant portion of the variance in these variables.  
Yermack (1996) verifies Jensen’s (1986) prediction of a negative correlation between firm performance and 
board size. Here, two primary reasons promoted are the increased problems with communication and coordination as 
group size increases, and the decreased ability of the board to control management because of the ‘free-riding’ problem 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998). Furthermore, it has been argued that independent directors are better monitors of managers 
because of the increased concern of such directors about their reputation in the directorship market (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). The board is presumed to become less independent as the number of inside directors increases proportionately. 
A less independent board is more likely to be characterised by a misalignment of interests between the firms’ owners 
and managers and thereby represents a weaker corporate governance structure. We use board independence, board 
size, CEO duality and institutional ownership as main variables for corporate governance. We hand-collected these 
data from the Definitive Proxy Statements (DEF 14A). 
 3.2.4  Control variables 
  The analysis includes a number of control variables, such as firm size, portfolio of products under 
development in a given year, leverage, firm age and accruals.  
Firms that experience high growth should also expect to have higher Tobin’s Q. In the corporate governance 
literature, concentrated ownership has been proposed as a mechanism to reduce agency costs due to separation and 
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control (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997). This is why cumulated ownership of shareholders with more than 5 
percent is included as a control variable. Firm size is also included as a control variable, as it seems plausible that 
agency costs are more substantial in larger firms due to the free rider problems associated with these firms  
Several studies (Ho and Wong 2001; Chau and Gray 2002) examined the proportion of shares owned by 
directors and dominant shareholders. They argued that as the proportion of the firm owned by outsiders increases, 
more information is required to be disclosed to satisfy the information needs of outsiders. We include the ownership 
held by insiders and top five owners as part of the principal component analysis. 
Several studies use firm profitability to predict voluntary disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1993; Meek, 
Roberts and Gray 1995; Ho and Wong 2001; Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Hassanein, Zalata and Hussainey 2018; 
Guo, Chan and Xue 2016). Companies that are performing well are more likely to voluntarily disclose information. 
Leverage (Leverage) is the ratio of long-term debt to owners’ equity. This measure is used in a number of 
studies (Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Meek et al. 1995; Raffournier 1995; Wallace and Naser 1995; Ho and Wong 
2001; Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Chau and Gray 2002; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002). A positive relationship is 
expected, as firms with more debt are likely to disclose more information to minimize legal risk. We control for a 
firm’s listing age to control for its stage in life cycle (Lundholm, 2003; Bukh, Nielsen, Gormsen and Mouritsen 2005; 
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005). A majority of biotechnology firms incur losses and their consequent needs for 
external funds can affect their disclosures. We ensure that the disclosure effects we observe are not an artefact of 
earnings manipulations. We control for accruals because the quality of earnings could also have complimentary and 
substitutive relation with disclosures (Kim and Verrecchia 1994). Earnings quality and earnings management are 
proxied by accruals, as is common in the literature (Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki 2004). We find an insignificant 
relation or positive relation between accruals and firm performance, consistent with the mixed evidence in the 
literature (Core, Guay, and Verdi 2008). 
We control for number of products for two reasons: portfolio diversification and the resources committed to 
research and development that affects current profitability. Firms diversify their product portfolios to reduce risk. A 
firm that receives bad news on one project can transfer resources to other products; one with fewer products lacks this 
possibility.  In other words, a firm’s number of products both represents and affects its ability to diversify. Guo et al. 
(2004) use number of products being developed by a firm as to capture product diversification. Higher number of 
products indicates greater investment in the research and development, which because of the current accounting rules, 
negatively affects the current reported corporate performance. We, therefore, predict a negative relationship between 
number of products and profitability. 
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Firm size (FirmSize) is the log of total assets. This measure is used in a number of voluntary disclosure 
studies (see Cooke 1991; Hossain, Perera and Rahman. 1995; Ho and Wong 2001; Camfferman and Cooke 2002; 
Ferguson et al. 2002; Gul and Leung 2004). There are a number of arguments for larger firms disclosing more 
information. Large firms are expected to voluntarily disclose more information than smaller firms to reduce the 
information asymmetry problem that emerges as entities get bigger (Jensen and Meckling 1976, p. 326). Furthermore, 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that large firms are more sensitive to political costs and will disclose more 
information to allay public criticism. Appendix B shows variables definitions and measurement.  
4 Results  
4.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The mean value of Tobin’s Q is 3.458. On average, firms disclose 
around 30 percent about their products under development. This is not surprising given the proprietary nature of the 
information embedded in the biotech industry. Even less (0.126) is the disclosure about products in early stages of 
development (e.g., Discl_Precl). The firms have, on average, about seven products (TotalProduct) in the pipeline in 
a given year. The biotech industry comprises young firms and less-profitable firms. In fact, the mean of years since 
inception (FirmAge) is 10 years with a maximum of 30 years; on average, about 22 percent of the firms are incurring 
losses (Loss).  
Table 2 reports the correlations between Tobin’s Q, disclosure, governance and control variables. Firm 
performance (TQ) is positively correlated with the overall disclosure index (Discl_Index), with the preclinical 
disclosure (Precl_Discl) and technical disclosure (Tech_Discl). Firm performance with corporate governance, 
however, is not clear. While Comp3 is positively associated, Comp1 has a negative association. Firm age (FirmAge) 
is positively and significantly associated with firm performance (TQ).  
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Results of the multivariate analysis are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5. To control for time-specific effects, 
we include dummy variables that equals one for each of the years 2005–2013 and zero otherwise. We estimate Eq. (1) 
using a fixed effects regression with standard errors clustered at the firm level. The fixed effects model has the 
advantage of controlling for the unobservable firm characteristics that are constant over time and correlated with the 
independent variables (Greene, 2000). We have an unbalanced panel data.  
In Table 3, we present the results of the effect of total product-disclosure index (Discl_Index) and corporate 
governance (Comp1, Comp2 and Comp3) on firm performance. We measure, corporate governance using components 
with an eigenvalue greater than one resulting from the principal component analysis. Column (1) presents the results 
of the regression for the effect of overall disclosure (Discl_Index) and Comp1 on firm performance proxy by Tobin’s 
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Q (TQ). We find that firms that disclose more tend to have a higher performance up to two periods ahead. Indeed, the 
coefficient on Discl_Index is positive and significant in all three columns (1-3) of Table 3. In year (t+3), the results 
are insignificant, many other factors could affect the three-years-ahead firm performance (e.g., discontinuing certain 
products, failure in the efficiency of the targeted disease, etc.). 
The coefficients on the interaction term, Discl_Index × P2, in Column 1-3 suggest a substitutive effect 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure provided by the biotech firms and the governance mechanisms (Comp2). 
This means that companies prefer either to engage in good reporting or to signal the good quality of the firm by 
employing better monitoring devices to enhance firm performance.  
The sample size differs in the three tables (Table 3–5) based on the different definitions or missing dependent 
and independent variables. For example, we have 342 firm-years observations for Comp1, Comp2 and Comp3 in 
Table 3, 4 and 5. The number of observations for total disclosure index, preclinical disclosure index and technical 
disclosure index, however, varies across the sample in Table 3–5. Therefore, the test observation varies when 
disclosure variables are interacted with Comp1, Comp2, and Comp3. The number of observations with future data, for 
firms with Tobin’s Q in years (t+1), (t+2), (t+3), changes as well. For example, Column 1 of Table 3 has 307 
observations for TQ (t), but only 298 observations for TQ (t+1) in Column 2. Another possibility was to conduct all 
tests with common set observations that have no missing variables for any test. We have not followed that design 
because it will drastically reduce our already small sample, which is based on hand-collected data from biotechnology 
firms.  
Further, we analyse whether early-stage product disclosures (Discl_Precl) and corporate governance (Comp1, Comp2, 
Comp3) improve firm performance (TQ). Table 4 reports the results. We do not find evidence that investors appreciate 
the disclosure provided by the biotech firms for their early-stage products (e.g., products in Investigational New Drug 
Application (IND), screening, development and in the preclinical phases according to the FDA drug classification). 
These results are consistent with Dedman et al.’s (2008) study, which shows that investors start having confidence in 
the firms’ products when they reach Phase II of development.  
When we look at the overall information environment and how that affects the firm performance, we do not 
find any supporting evidence. Note that the interaction between firm disclosure and the second Comp (Comp2 = board 
size) of corporate governance is insignificant with preclinical disclosures (Table 4) but significant with more advanced 
stage disclosures. The latter type of disclosures is more informative and reliable, because they are closer to product 
launch and profitability, than are disclosures on products that are in early experimental stage and have a long way to 
go. Therefore, the later type of disclosures that are better predictive of forthcoming profitability than are formal 
disclosures that merely convey highly uncertain prospects. Our results show that disclosures and corporate governance 
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have a substitutive relationship, but only for disclosures related to advanced-stage products and not for products that 
are literally shot-in-dark. These results are consistent with the idea that better governance has similar effect as 
enhanced disclosures, but only for disclosures that have significant information-asymmetry reducing effect. 
Finally, in Table 5 we look at the extent of technical product-related disclosure, proxied by Tech_Discl 
information (e.g., disclosure about product specifications–information about why the product is better than 
competing/existing products on the market, what the composition of the molecule is, target disease and clinical trials) 
and corporate governance (Comp1, Comp2, Comp3) affect current and future firm performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. 
The information about the product specification contains strategic and important disclosure about the efficacy, toxicity 
and composition of the products. Moreover, it also contains critical disclosure about the innovation activities the firms 
are pursuing. We find a positive and significant (p-value <5%) effect on the firm performance up to three periods 
ahead. See the results for Columns 1-3 of Table 5. This means that this information is valuable to investors who 
appreciate the specificities of the product under development disclosure. In Columns 1-3, we find a positive impact 
of the second component (Comp2) on the firm performance (TQ). These results support the mixed evidence of the 
effect of board size on firm performance. The interaction coefficient (Tech_Discl×P2) is negative and significant, 
supporting a substitution effect between technical product-disclosure and governance. Please note that sample size 
differs in the three tables and across the various columns (Tables 3, 4 and 5) because of the different definitions and 
measurement of dependent and independent variables, particularly such as firm disclosures (total disclosure index, 
preclinical disclosure index and technical disclosure index), their interactions with the governance variables (Comp1, 
Comp2 and Comp3) as well as the definition for the future Tobin’s Q (t+1, t+2, t+3).   
5     Robustness tests 
We perform a series of robustness tests. First, as a measure of board busyness, we use the percentage of board 
members who are on more than four boards. Second, we include the percentage of insiders’ ownership in the principal 
component analysis; the results remain qualitatively the same. Third, information asymmetry leads to disclosure 
clientele, which is turn, affects the firm’s choice of corporate governance. We acknowledge this possibility. We partly 
address this issue by controlling for institutional ownership, which we believe proxies in part for the role of ownership 
by index funds. Please note that our main dependent variable is firm performance, while our key independent variables 
are the fixed effects of, and interaction between, corporate governance and disclosures. Thus, whether disclosures 
affect institutional ownership, and thus, governance or whether governance affects disclosures, the empirical tests 
remain substantially the same. The results for this robustness test are presented in Tables 6, 7 and 8.   
Fourth, we control for the endogeneity problem using lagged independent variables as suggested in González 
(2015).  Note that our dependent variable is also measured in future years, thus, by construction, the independent 
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variables are lagged. The use of lagged variable is also in line with Larcker and Rusticus (2010), methods of resolving 
possible reverse causality problems as well as the existence of a potential simultaneous relationship between the 
disclosures and firm performance. We also address the likelihood of disclosures affecting governance instead of the 
other way around. Firms could select their type of disclosures to attract a certain type of investors who implement 
different corporate governance practices. We conduct an additional test, by using lagged governance variable to reduce 
the possibility of governance affecting.  Tables 9, 10 and 11 reports the results for the lagged TQ-disclosure and 
governance. The results remain consistent as in the main tables: Tables 3, 4, and 5.  
6    Conclusions 
We extend prior research on disclosure-performance and governance-performance relationships by 
examining an important issue: whether firms use disclosure and governance mechanisms as substitutes or 
complementary mechanisms to signal their performance. We also investigate whether this relationship depends on the 
informativeness and reliability of disclosures.  
We find that corporate voluntary disclosure positively affects both current and future firm performance in 
years (t+1) and (t+2). We also find that governance mechanisms (Comp2) positively affect both current and future 
firm performance in years (t+1) and (t+2). When we examine the joint effect of product-related disclosure and 
governance, we find that disclosure and governance are substitutes in explaining the current and future performance 
of biotech companies. So, the marginal benefit of corporate governance and disclosures in improving firm 
performance is decreasing in the presence of each other.   
Additional analysis shows that our findings are sensitive to the type of product-related disclosure by biotech 
companies. When we focus on firms with early-stage product disclosures, we find that neither disclosure nor 
governance affect firm performance. However, when we focus on firms that disclose technical product-related 
information, we find that both disclosure and governance affect firm performance and are substitutes. Yet this 
substitutive relation holds only for disclosures that have significant information-asymmetry reducing effect. 
We contribute to a growing literature on disclosure, governance and firm performance by being the first to 
study the joint impact of governance and disclosure on firm performance. Our findings suggest promising 
opportunities for future research. While we use a good proxy for product-related disclosure quality, future research 
could develop a more refined measure of quality that considers the qualitative characteristics of useful information 
suggested by International Accounting Standard Board, IASB, 2010. In the future, it would be interesting to examine 
the factors that determine the choice between disclosure and governance as substitute forms for biotech firms.   
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APPENDIX A 
Product disclosure index 
The disclosure index is constructed for each biotechnology product by hand-collecting relevant information 
from annual reports (Business section of Form 10-K). Information is derived for the following five categories: product 
specifications, target disease, clinical trials, future development plans, and market information. The procedure for 
assigning scores in each category is tabulated (with a detailed example) in the Appendix A continued. 
 
C.1. Measurement of product disclosure index 
I. Product specifications 
1.  How does the product work? (3 points = three sentences; 2 = two sentences; 1 = one sentence; 0 = none) 
2a. Why is it better than previous products? (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = no discussion) 
2b. Why is it better than competing products? (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = no discussion) 
3. What is the chemical/biological structure? (2 = chemical compound; 1 = general discussion; 0 = not 
mentioned) 
Subtotal I = total scores of (1 + max(2a, 2b) + 3) 
 
II. Target disease 
1. What kind of diseases does the product treat? (2 = disease name mentioned; 1 = disease name not mentioned; 0 
= no discussion) 
2. What are other possible uses of the drug? (2 = disease name mentioned; 1 = disease name not mentioned; 0 = 
no discussion) 
Subtotal II = total scores of (1 + 2) 
 
III. Clinical trials 
1. Number of patients (1 = given; 0 = absent) 
2. Patients information (with what diseases) (1 = given; 0 = absent) 
3. Doses (amounts) used in the clinical trial (1 = given; 0 = absent) 
4. Method used in the clinical trial (1 = given; 0 = absent) 
5. Treatment schedule (duration or frequency) (1 = given; 0 = absent) 
6. Trial results [detailed = pro and cons + numbers (3); general = numbers (2); brief = no numbers (1); none (0)] 
Subtotal III = total scores of (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6) 
 
IV. Future plans 
1a. Is there any plan to try the product on new diseases? (2 = disease name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 
= no discussion) 
1b. Is there any plan to try the product with other products? (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = 
not mentioned) 
2. Future plan for clinical trials 
2a. Planned date (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
2b. Number of patients for the planned trial (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
2c. Patient information for the planned trial (what disease) (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
2d. Duration (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
2e. Method (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
3. Possible alliance (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
Subtotal IV = total scores of (max(1a, 1b) + 2a + 2b + 2c + 2d + 2e + 3) 
 
V. Market information 
1. Number of patients affected by the disease (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
2. Number of incidents (market size) (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
Subtotal V = total scores of scores (1 + 2) 
Overall disclosure score = sum of Subtotals I–V 
Scaled disclosure score = overall disclosure score divided by 30 for products either in or beyond the clinical trials 
phase; by 22 for the products that did not reach clinical trials 
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APPENDIX A continued 
Product disclosure index 
C.2. An example of the measurement of product disclosure index 
Company MAXYGEN  
Product MAXY-G34 
Development stage Phase II 
    
Disclosure index (information is drawn from the 
Business section, Part I, of Form 10-K) Score contents 
I. Product specifications    
1. How does the product work? (3 = three 
sentences; 2 = two sentences; 1= one sentence; 0 
= none) 1. Helps the body make blood cells. 
2a. Why is it better than previous products? (2 = 
name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = not 
mentioned) 
2. MAXY-G34 reduces the duration of neutropenia when 
compared with the currently marketed products (Neulasta 
and Neupogen). 
2b. Why is it better than competing products? (2 
= name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = 
not mentioned) 
2. MAXY-G34 protects patients from chemotherapy and 
radiation therapy–related infections, shortens the duration 
of hospital stays, and helps keep patients on schedule for 
their cancer treatments.  
3. What is the chemical structure in addition to its 
chemical name? (2= name mentioned; 0 = not 
mentioned)  0. Not mentioned. 
Subtotal I = total scores of (1 + max (2a, 2b) + 
3) 3, out of a maximum of 7. 
II. Target diseases    
1. What kind of diseases does the product treat? 
(2 = disease name mentioned; 1 = disease name 
not mentioned; 0 = not mentioned)  2. Neutropenia. 
2. What are the other possible uses? (2 = disease 
name mentioned; 1 = disease name not 
mentioned; 0 = not mentioned)  0. Not mentioned. 
Subtotal II = total scores of (1 + 2)  2, out of a maximum of 4. 
 
III. Clinical trials    
1. Number of patients (1= mentioned; 0 = not 
mentioned)  1. 47  
2. Patients information (with what disease) (1 = 
name mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
1. Patients with breast cancer who have failed at least one 
potentially curative treatment regimen. 
3. Doses (amounts) used in the clinical trial (1 = 
mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 1. 5 to 100 µg/kg was given. 
4. Method (via what kind of media) used in the 
clinical trial (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 1. Subcutaneous injection. 
5. Treatment schedule (duration or frequency) (1 
= given; 0 = absent) 
1. Single dose MAXY-G34 therapy being administered per 
three-week chemotherapy cycle with each patient receiving 
six cycles of docetaxel. 
6. Results (3 = detailed discussion; 2 = general 
discussion; 1 = brief discussion; 0 = no 
discussion)  
2. Results of the Phase I clinical trial indicate that the drug 
MAXY-G34 was generally safe and well tolerated through 
the study.  
Subtotal III = total scores of (1 + 2+ 3 + 4 + 5 + 
6)  7, out of a maximum of 8. 
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APPENDIX A continued 
Product disclosure index 
IV. Future development plans   
1a. Is there any plan to try the product on new diseases? (2 = 
name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 2. Hemophilia.  
1b. Is there any plan to try the product with other products? (2 
= name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = not 
mentioned) 0.  Not mentioned.  
2. Future plan for clinical trials    
2a. Planned date (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 1. 2008. 
2b. Number of patients for the planned trial (what disease) (1 = 
mentioned; 0 = not mentioned)  0. Not mentioned. 
2c. Patient information for the planned trial (what disease) (1 = 
mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 1. Breast cancer patients.  
2d. Duration (1= mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 0. Not mentioned. 
2e. Method (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 0. Not mentioned. 
3. Alliance (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = 
not mentioned)  2. Entered into a strategic alliance with Roche. 
Subtotal IV = total scores of [max (1a, 1b) + 2a + 2b + 2c + 
2d + 2e + 3) 6, out of a maximum of 9. 
V. Market information    
1. Number of patients affected by the disease (1 = mentioned; 
0 = not mentioned) 0.  Not mentioned. 
2. Number of incidents (market size) (1 = mentioned; 0 = not 
mentioned) 0.  Not mentioned. 
Subtotal V = total scores of (1 + 2) 0, out of a maximum of 2. 
Overall disclosure score = sum of Subtotals I–V 18, out of a maximum of 30.  
Scaled disclosure score = overall disclosure score divided by 
30 because MAXY-G34 is in clinical trials phase 0.60, out of a maximum of 1.00. 
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APPENDIX B 
Definitions of variables 
 
Variable name Variable description Definition 
TQ 
 
 
Discl-Index 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 
Disclosure Index 
(Short-term debt + long-term debt + market value of 
equity)/total asset and MTBV as market value of equity/total 
equity. 
Overall disclosure index as defined in Appendix A.   
Precl discl-Index Preclinical Disclosure 
Index 
Average disclosure index related to products in an early stage 
of development (not yet human/clinical trials).  
Technical Discl-Index Technical Disclosure 
Index 
Average disclosure index related to the technical information 
(product specifications + target disease + clinical trials). 
Market Discl-Index  Market Disclosure Index  Average disclosure index related to the market information 
(future plans + market information). 
Totalprod Total number of products  Total number of products in development per firm/year.  
Comp1 The first component with 
an eigenvalue >1 from the 
principal component 
analysis.  
The first component with an eigenvalue of 1.4 is represented by 
the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Comp2 
 
 
 
 
Comp3 
 
The second component 
with an eigenvalue >1 
from the principal 
component analysis. 
The third component with 
an eigenvalue >1 from the 
principal component 
analysis. 
The second component with an eigenvalue of 1.4 is represented 
by the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
 
 
The third component with an eigenvalue of 1.07 is represented 
by the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
 
Data from Compustat annual 
 
FirmSize 
                                                                  
 
TQ 
Market value of total 
assets 
 
Tobin’s Q     
Market Value of Equity (Price {PRCC_F} × Number of Shares 
Outstanding {CSHO}) +Total Debt [long-term debt (DLTT) + 
short-term debt (DLC)] 
The market value of equity plus the book value of total debt  
divided by the book value of total assets (mvce+ lt+ esopt)/at). 
Accruals 
 
Accruals 
 
[Change in Current Assets (ACT) – Change in Cash (CHE) – 
Change in Current Liabilities (LCT) – Change in Tax Payable 
(TXP) – Depreciation and Amortization (DP)], scaled by 
average Total Assets for the year. 
Leverage 
 
Financial Leverage Total Debt [long-term debt (DLTT) + short-term debt (DLC)] /  
Market Value of Equity (Price {PRCC_F} × Number of Shares 
Outstanding {CSHO}). 
ListYear Listing Year  First year in which a firm’s data are available in Compustat is 
the listing year.  
FirmAge Firm age Difference between ListYear and current year, expressed in 
years. 
LogFirmSize Log of market value of 
total assets 
Natural logarithm of FirmSize. 
Loss 
 
 
 
Profitability A dummy variable equal to 1 if the ratio of earnings before 
extraordinary items (IB) to average Total Assets for the year is 
greater than 0, and 0 otherwise.  
 
All variables with prefix “L.” in the tables imply lagged variables 
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Table 1 Summary statistics  
 mean sd min max 
TQ 3.458 2.657 0.369 15.044 
Discl_Index 0.303 0.125 0.011 0.820 
Discl_Precl 0.126 0.135 0.000 0.570 
Discl_Clinical 0.304 0.145 0.000 0.610 
Tech_Discl 0.213 0.091 0.000 0.467 
Market_Discl 0.080 0.054 0.000 0.267 
Comp1 8.475 3.368 4.113 22.110 
Comp2 8.050 1.760 4.668 12.940 
Comp3 -1.128 0.696 -2.766 0.544 
Totalproduct 6.861 7.023 0.000 64.000 
Leverage 0.498 0.445 0.025 3.518 
FirmAge (years) 10.612 6.976 0.000 30.000 
Loss 0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 
FirmSize 4.789 1.668 1.309 10.503 
Accruals -0.023 0.135 -0.650 0.446 
N 647    
This table describes the univariate statistics of the main variables use in this study as well as those for the control 
variables in multivariate regressions. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 2 Correlation table 
 (1) (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12)  (13)  (14) (15) 
TQ (1) 1                             
Discl_Index(2) 0.076 1              
Discl_Precl (3) 0.074 0.010 1             
Discl_Clinical (4) 0.026 0.620*** -0.243*** 1            
Tech_Discl (5) 0.068 0.759*** 0.096* 0.479*** 1           
Market_Discl (6) 0.021 0.714*** -0.038 0.550*** 0.482*** 1          
Comp1 (7) -0.140* -0.025 -0.075 -0.041 0.010 -0.024 1         
Comp2 (8) -0.074 -0.175** -0.076 -0.136* -0.172** -0.153** -0.012 1        
Comp3 (9) 0.201*** 0.019 0.103 -0.147** 0.087 -0.003 0.001 -0.031 1       
TotalProduct (10) -0.091* -0.292*** -0.010 -0.183*** -0.280*** -0.222*** -0.046 0.345*** -0.154** 1      
Leverage  (11) 0.252*** -0.064 -0.070 -0.052 -0.073 -0.010 0.071 -0.066 0.004 -0.031 1     
FirmAge(12) 0.102* -0.117** -0.159*** -0.128** -0.124** -0.075 0.044 0.153** 0.108* 0.265*** 0.010 1    
Loss (13) -0.076 -0.176*** -0.152*** -0.154*** -0.206*** -0.147*** 0.173** 0.165** 0.065 0.192*** -0.051 0.343*** 1   
FirmSize(14) -0.085 -0.165*** -0.115** -0.141*** -0.199*** -0.099* 0.09 0.569*** -0.078 0.492*** -0.033 0.394*** 0.475*** 1  
Accruals (16) -0.018 -0.012 0.018 -0.060 -0.011 -0.049 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.002 -0.193*** 0.009 0.075 0.004 1 
This table presents the correlations among the variables used in this study. All variables are defined in Appendix B.***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
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Table 3 The effect of total product-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm performance 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
TQ(t) TQ(t+1) TQ(t+2) TQ(t+3) 
     
Discl_Index 11.149* 17.291** 15.229* 2.361 
 (6.538) (8.269) (8.158) (9.715) 
Comp1 -0.011 -0.099 0.048 -0.261 
 (0.135) (0.155) (0.145) (0.224) 
Comp2 0.431* 0.572** 0.652** 0.381 
 (0.247) (0.263) (0.321) (0.286) 
Comp3 0.743 1.015 2.270** 1.422 
 (0.798) (0.896) (1.071) (0.946) 
Discl_Index×P1 -0.296 -0.352 -0.443 0.570 
 (0.428) (0.489) (0.424) (0.715) 
Discl_Index×P2 -1.188** -2.099*** -2.616*** -1.351 
 (0.532) (0.667) (0.877) (0.939) 
Discl_Index×P3 -0.885 -2.025 -5.493** -3.129 
 (2.083) (2.089) (2.373) (2.231) 
TotalProduct -0.038 -0.066* -0.086* -0.089* 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.044) (0.047) 
Leverage 1.183*** 0.834* 0.442 0.870 
 (0.372) (0.441) (0.565) (0.581) 
FirmAge 0.088* 0.066 0.051 0.032 
 (0.045) (0.050) (0.051) (0.056) 
Loss 0.335 0.142 0.232 0.455 
 (0.575) (0.709) (0.860) (0.923) 
LogFirmSize -0.369* -0.124 0.021 0.093 
 (0.212) (0.174) (0.195) (0.202) 
Accruals 0.432 2.385** 0.682 -0.816 
 (0.876) (1.076) (1.115) (1.036) 
Constant 2.631 1.412 1.290 3.518 
 (2.480) (3.232) (3.446) (3.565) 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 307 299 284 276 
R-Squared 0.178 0.265 0.241 0.189 
This table presents examines the effects of disclosures and corporate governance on firm performance in a multivariate 
regression. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix B.***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 The effect of preclinical product-disclosure and corporate governance on firm performance 
 
VARIABLES 
          (1)          (2)         (3)          (4) 
       TQ(t)     TQ(t+1)     TQ(t+2)    TQ(t+3) 
      
Discl_Precl 4.599 -0.851 -4.733 -2.812 
 (7.226) (9.583) (10.462) (9.381) 
Comp1 -0.079 -0.254*** -0.195*** -0.106 
 (0.066) (0.086) (0.071) (0.080) 
Comp2 0.058 -0.091 -0.197 -0.068 
 (0.166) (0.176) (0.198) (0.191) 
Comp3 0.351 0.337 0.363 0.380 
 (0.349) (0.533) (0.489) (0.607) 
Discl_Precl×P1 -0.198 0.381 0.726** 0.039 
 (0.369) (0.428) (0.349) (0.444) 
Discl_Precl×P2 0.072 0.088 0.325 0.442 
 (0.870) (0.956) (1.060) (0.945) 
Discl_Precl×P3 0.895 0.704 1.969 0.560 
 (1.514) (1.683) (1.535) (1.660) 
TotalProduct -0.027 -0.041 -0.046 -0.069* 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.043) (0.040) 
Leverage 1.210*** 0.866* 0.635 0.794 
 (0.366) (0.437) (0.567) (0.596) 
FirmAge 0.081* 0.051 0.029 0.013 
 (0.046) (0.053) (0.060) (0.058) 
Loss 0.395 0.301 0.583 0.530 
 (0.643) (0.799) (0.943) (0.966) 
LogFirmSize -0.295 -0.062 0.070 0.111 
 (0.217) (0.213) (0.230) (0.226) 
Accruals 0.597 2.959*** 2.172* -0.298 
 (0.925) (1.011) (1.137) (1.010) 
Constant 4.963*** 6.510*** 6.347*** 4.338** 
 (1.322) (2.204) (2.196) (2.092) 
Year Controls       YES      YES        YES        YES 
Observations        309       301         285         277 
R-Squared      0.185     0.239       0.187       0.164 
This table presents examines the effects of preclinical product-disclosure and corporate governance on firm 
performance in a multivariate regression. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined 
in Appendix B.***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 The effect of technical product-disclosure and corporate governance on firm performance 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2)       (3)      (4) 
      TQ   TQ(t+1)  TQ(t+2) TQ(t+3) 
      
Tech_Discl 21.102** 30.548** 23.223* 6.732 
 (8.559) (14.729) (12.501) (12.872) 
Comp1 -0.066 -0.007 0.004 -0.250 
 (0.124) (0.186) (0.134) (0.190) 
Comp2 0.618** 0.625** 0.703* 0.305 
 (0.254) (0.296) (0.355) (0.274) 
Comp3 0.026 0.342 1.614 0.217 
 (0.749) (0.917) (1.050) (0.897) 
Tech_Discl×P1 -0.115 -0.866 -0.427 0.692 
 (0.562) (0.840) (0.577) (0.822) 
Tech_Discl×P2 -2.445*** -2.998** -3.710** -1.469 
 (0.828) (1.239) (1.518) (1.335) 
Tech_Discl×P3 2.297 0.589 -4.120 1.247 
 (2.657) (3.045) (3.263) (2.802) 
TotalProduct -0.057* -0.073* -0.094* -0.093* 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.050) (0.048) 
Leverage 1.202*** 0.823* 0.463 0.928 
 (0.337) (0.428) (0.548) (0.587) 
FirmAge 0.080* 0.055 0.029 0.016 
 (0.042) (0.048) (0.053) (0.055) 
Loss 0.372 0.300 0.337 0.530 
 (0.522) (0.694) (0.823) (0.880) 
LogFirmSize -0.401* -0.177 -0.006 0.084 
 (0.210) (0.186) (0.214) (0.204) 
Accruals 0.250 2.568** 1.091 -0.562 
 (0.869) (1.001) (1.122) (0.957) 
Constant 1.564 0.098 1.068 2.845 
 (2.177) (3.295) (3.129) (3.175) 
Year Controls   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Observations    313    305    289     281 
R-Squared   0.192  0.256   0.214    0.173 
This table presents examines the effects of technical product-disclosure and corporate governance on firm performance 
in a multivariate regression. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 
B.***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 The effect of total product-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm performance after controlling 
for institutional ownership 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TQ TQ+1 TQ+2 TQ+3 
Discl_Index 11.532* 17.507** 15.467* 2.659 
 [6.386] [8.056] [7.976] [9.605] 
Comp1 -0.041 -0.115 0.038 -0.271 
 [0.138] [0.156] [0.148] [0.229] 
Comp2 0.539** 0.631** 0.700** 0.425 
 [0.243] [0.256] [0.314] [0.287] 
Comp3 0.716 0.995 2.244** 1.397 
 [0.808] [0.897] [1.064] [0.947] 
Discl_index×p1 -0.202 -0.302 -0.406 0.603 
 [0.443] [0.495] [0.433] [0.731] 
Discl_index×p2 -1.331** -2.173*** -2.674*** -1.407 
 [0.529] [0.646] [0.853] [0.932] 
Discl_index×p3 -0.848 -1.993 -5.426** -3.069 
 [2.100] [2.070] [2.347] [2.219] 
Totalproduct -0.021 -0.056* -0.078* -0.082* 
 [0.030] [0.033] [0.043] [0.044] 
Leverage  1.052*** 0.767* 0.381 0.820 
 [0.356] [0.433] [0.597] [0.614] 
FirmAge 0.091** 0.067 0.051 0.033 
 [0.044] [0.049] [0.051] [0.055] 
Loss 0.391 0.174 0.254 0.482 
 [0.511] [0.680] [0.844] [0.915] 
LogFirmSize -0.688*** -0.298 -0.119 -0.028 
 [0.205] [0.179] [0.222] [0.225] 
Accruals 0.409 2.397** 0.694 -0.771 
 [0.835] [1.083] [1.116] [1.031] 
Instown_perc 1.772*** 0.954 0.766 0.660 
 [0.560] [0.650] [0.766] [0.745] 
Constant 2.676 1.437 1.268 3.476 
 [2.447] [3.174] [3.382] [3.527] 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 307 299 284 276 
R-squared 0.216 0.272 0.246 0.192 
This table presents examines the effects of total product-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm 
performance in a multivariate regression after controlling for institutional ownership. Robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix B.***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7 The effect of preclinical product-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm performance after 
controlling for institutional ownership 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TQ TQ+1 TQ+2 TQ+3 
Discl_Precl 6.088 -0.130 -4.014 -2.121 
 [6.923] [9.581] [10.603] [9.256] 
Comp1 -0.066 -0.248*** -0.185** -0.100 
 [0.059] [0.086] [0.070] [0.080] 
Comp2 0.125 -0.059 -0.167 -0.040 
 [0.158] [0.180] [0.205] [0.192] 
Comp3 0.291 0.312 0.345 0.360 
 [0.357] [0.542] [0.493] [0.615] 
Discl_Precl×P1 -0.294 0.336 0.675* -0.006 
 [0.346] [0.425] [0.356] [0.453] 
Discl_Precl×P2 0.030 0.063 0.306 0.421 
 [0.845] [0.941] [1.051] [0.931] 
Discl_Precl×P3 1.032 0.746 1.976 0.600 
 [1.483] [1.647] [1.499] [1.646] 
TotalProduct -0.009 -0.032 -0.038 -0.062* 
 [0.026] [0.029] [0.041] [0.037] 
Leverage  1.065*** 0.805* 0.571 0.737 
 [0.354] [0.435] [0.601] [0.635] 
FirmAge 0.086* 0.053 0.030 0.014 
 [0.046] [0.053] [0.060] [0.058] 
Loss 0.451 0.328 0.602 0.553 
 [0.596] [0.778] [0.928] [0.961] 
LogFirmSize -0.611*** -0.207 -0.059 -0.004 
 [0.226] [0.225] [0.251] [0.255] 
Accruals  0.572 2.965*** 2.177* -0.268 
 [0.883] [1.013] [1.130] [1.013] 
Instown_perc 1.780*** 0.807 0.716 0.641 
 [0.586] [0.736] [0.814] [0.815] 
Constant 4.820*** 6.443*** 6.247*** 4.258** 
 [1.260] [2.194] [2.193] [2.094] 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 309 301 285 277 
R-squared 0.223 0.244 0.191 0.167 
This table presents examines the effects of preclinical product-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm 
performance in a multivariate regression after controlling for institutional ownership. Robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix B.***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8 The effect of technical product-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm performance after 
controlling for institutional ownership 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TQ TQ+1 TQ+2 TQ+3 
Tech_Discl 22.901*** 31.532** 24.049* 7.549 
 [8.123] [14.500] [12.310] [12.722] 
Comp1 -0.070 -0.010 0.003 -0.250 
 [0.125] [0.187] [0.135] [0.191] 
Comp2 0.736*** 0.690** 0.759** 0.351 
 [0.242] [0.284] [0.349] [0.271] 
Comp3 0.123 0.387 1.650 0.251 
 [0.730] [0.903] [1.046] [0.890] 
Tech_Discl×P1 -0.103 -0.858 -0.415 0.691 
 [0.566] [0.851] [0.584] [0.828] 
Tech_Discl×P2 -2.672*** -3.119** -3.811** -1.553 
 [0.790] [1.199] [1.483] [1.312] 
Tech_Discl×P3 1.781 0.338 -4.310 1.064 
 [2.599] [2.983] [3.250] [2.779] 
TotalProduct -0.037 -0.063* -0.085* -0.085* 
 [0.032] [0.036] [0.049] [0.045] 
Leverage 1.091*** 0.766* 0.408 0.887 
 [0.326] [0.426] [0.580] [0.615] 
FirmAge 0.086** 0.057 0.031 0.018 
 [0.040] [0.047] [0.052] [0.054] 
Loss 0.468 0.355 0.378 0.573 
 [0.475] [0.671] [0.811] [0.880] 
LogFirmSize -0.734*** -0.361* -0.160 -0.041 
 [0.207] [0.186] [0.240] [0.224] 
Accruals 0.294 2.612** 1.134 -0.491 
 [0.838] [1.010] [1.129] [0.949] 
Instown_perc 1.792*** 0.977 0.818 0.661 
 [0.523] [0.630] [0.730] [0.694] 
Constant 1.335 -0.024 0.949 2.717 
 [2.113] [3.253] [3.063] [3.136] 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 313 305 289 281 
R-squared 0.230 0.264 0.219 0.177 
This table presents examines the effects of technical product-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm 
performance in a multivariate regression after controlling for institutional ownership. Robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix B.***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 The effect of lagged total product-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm performance 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TQ TQ(t+1) TQ(t+2) TQ(t+3) 
Discl_Index 14.663** 22.337*** 16.513* 12.861 
 [6.101] [7.669] [8.874] [9.397] 
L.Comp1 -0.106 -0.010 -0.046 -0.052 
 [0.099] [0.128] [0.149] [0.152] 
L.Comp2 0.497** 0.865** 0.863** 0.608* 
 [0.243] [0.328] [0.353] [0.350] 
L.Comp3 0.648 1.283 1.684 1.150 
 [1.010] [1.001] [1.131] [0.706] 
L.Comp1*Discl_Index -0.029 -0.320 -0.227 -0.289 
 [0.278] [0.316] [0.338] [0.398] 
L.Comp2*Discl_Index -1.809*** -2.928*** -2.754*** -1.693 
 [0.668] [0.836] [0.992] [1.232] 
L.Comp3*Discl_Index -0.732 -2.750 -4.098 -2.798 
 [2.302] [2.169] [2.670] [1.797] 
TotalProduct -0.053* -0.071** -0.085*** -0.081** 
 [0.030] [0.028] [0.031] [0.035] 
Leverage 1.294*** 1.147** 1.312** 1.288** 
 [0.401] [0.522] [0.498] [0.536] 
FirmAge 0.086* 0.095** 0.081* 0.047 
 [0.045] [0.044] [0.047] [0.051] 
Loss 0.151 0.128 -0.302 0.118 
 [0.567] [0.669] [0.675] [0.740] 
LogFirmSize -0.192 -0.289* -0.191 -0.186 
 [0.163] [0.150] [0.211] [0.217] 
Accruals -0.258 -1.390 1.343 0.963 
 [1.228] [1.492] [2.369] [2.092] 
Constant 2.623 0.086 -0.001 0.735 
 [2.464] [3.022] [3.193] [3.121] 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 248 244 231 231 
R-squared 0.248 0.300 0.257 0.191 
This table presents examines the effects of lagged total product-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm 
performance in a multivariate regression. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined 
in Appendix B.***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10 The effect of lagged preclinical-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm performance 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TQ TQ(t+1) TQ(t+2) TQ(t+3) 
Discl_Precl 12.204 5.468 3.064 -12.660 
 [8.940] [12.284] [10.741] [9.943] 
L.Comp1 -0.080 -0.148* -0.149** -0.153** 
 [0.057] [0.075] [0.070] [0.070] 
L.Comp2 0.040 0.106 0.104 -0.043 
 [0.181] [0.217] [0.192] [0.225] 
L.Comp3 0.356 0.513 0.175 0.265 
 [0.422] [0.562] [0.446] [0.593] 
L.Comp1*Discl_Precl -0.215 0.521 0.271 -0.375 
 [0.297] [0.330] [0.423] [0.458] 
L.Comp2*Discl_Precl -0.869 -1.011 -0.297 1.726 
 [1.087] [1.308] [1.211] [1.040] 
L.comp3*Discl_Precl 0.719 0.431 1.756 -0.597 
 [1.937] [1.885] [1.970] [2.386] 
TotalProduct -0.046* -0.054** -0.058** -0.059** 
 [0.027] [0.025] [0.027] [0.028] 
Leverage 1.254*** 1.417** 1.528** 1.402** 
 [0.417] [0.558] [0.583] [0.626] 
FirmAge 0.078 0.084* 0.078 0.036 
 [0.047] [0.049] [0.051] [0.057] 
Loss 0.208 0.350 0.069 0.308 
 [0.649] [0.813] [0.763] [0.728] 
LogFirmSize -0.099 -0.234 -0.219 -0.207 
 [0.204] [0.181] [0.226] [0.228] 
Accruals 0.218 -1.476 1.469 0.540 
 [1.189] [1.503] [2.638] [2.338] 
Constant 4.902*** 5.387** 4.095** 5.898*** 
 [1.667] [2.463] [1.901] [1.850] 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 248 245 231 231 
R-squared 0.240 0.242 0.200 0.194 
This table presents examines the effects of lagged preclinical-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm 
performance in a multivariate regression. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined 
in Appendix B.***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 11 The effect of lagged technical-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm performance 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TQ TQ(t+1) TQ(t+2) TQ(t+3) 
Tech_Discl 25.466** 31.191** 22.225* 9.045 
 [9.946] [11.787] [12.142] [11.442] 
L.Comp1 -0.101 0.038 -0.069 -0.049 
 [0.115] [0.143] [0.131] [0.109] 
L.Comp2 0.621** 0.848*** 0.823*** 0.246 
 [0.245] [0.315] [0.305] [0.283] 
L.Comp3 -0.203 0.799 0.733 0.005 
 [0.897] [0.941] [1.045] [0.818] 
L.Comp1*Tech_Discl -0.081 -0.600 -0.248 -0.445 
 [0.479] [0.532] [0.455] [0.365] 
L.Comp2*Tech_Discl -2.877*** -3.670*** -3.288** -0.550 
 [1.056] [1.256] [1.400] [1.423] 
L.Comp3*Tech_Discl 2.796 -1.362 -1.221 1.034 
 [2.759] [2.934] [3.225] [2.741] 
TotalProduct -0.075** -0.080** -0.098*** -0.082** 
 [0.034] [0.032] [0.035] [0.039] 
Leverage 1.204*** 1.135** 1.307** 1.196** 
 [0.384] [0.531] [0.498] [0.553] 
FirmAge 0.079* 0.083* 0.065 0.041 
 [0.042] [0.044] [0.048] [0.051] 
Loss 0.245 0.288 -0.144 0.129 
 [0.521] [0.680] [0.627] [0.712] 
LogFirmSize -0.236 -0.303** -0.217 -0.178 
 [0.168] [0.146] [0.206] [0.209] 
Accruals -0.558 -0.902 1.667 0.942 
 [1.191] [1.522] [2.452] [2.159] 
Constant 1.568 -0.519 -0.120 2.399 
 [2.430] [3.027] [2.828] [2.557] 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 252 249 235 235 
R-squared 0.252 0.273 0.235 0.177 
This table presents examines the effects of lagged technical-disclosure index and corporate governance on firm 
performance in a multivariate regression. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined 
in Appendix B.***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
